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1 Introduction
Cybercrime is a huge issue, and regular Internet users are usually its victims. Ac-
cording to Norton, cybercrime cost $110 billion in 2012. Additionally, 66% of adults
using the Internet have been victims of some kind of cybercrime in their lifetime,
such as online scams, credit card frauds, hacking and malware attacks. [55] Over
the years, various significant data thefts have been reported. One example is a card-
processing company, Heartland Payment Systems, which was a victim of theft of
over 130 million credit and debit card numbers. [3, 43]
As the Internet and web services gained popularity, it became more intriguing
to attackers to try to exploit these services and servers running them. The more
people online, the more possibilities it opens to attackers. From 2000 to 2010, the
number of the Internet users increased from 360 million to over 2 billion [6].
Security was overlooked when the predecessor of the Internet, the ARPANET,
was being developed. Its main goal was to share resources over the network. That is
why protocol specifications focused on the operational behaviour. The environment
was not considered hostile as it can be described today. Even though the Internet
protocol suite has developed from its early versions, it still utilizes the core protocols
that were adopted by the ARPANET in the 1980s. [39]
Appropriate security precautions are needed in order to protect hosts against
different threats on the Internet. Intrusion prevention systems and firewalls are
important aspects of network security, and these types of solutions have been widely
deployed. The most important function of an intrusion prevention system is stopping
malicious content from reaching its destination. Firewalls are used for limiting
network access. A firewall analyses incoming and outgoing network traffic and filters
the traffic according to its rules. [30, 69]
Even though intrusion prevention systems bring additional security to the net-
work, they are not bulletproof. There are techniques, such as evasions, which can be
used to try to outsmart them. Evasion techniques are used to masquerade attacks
in order to avoid detection by security appliances. When an attack is equipped with
evasions, it is actually masked to look like legal data from the point of view of a
security appliance, such as an intrusion prevention system. That is why it might
allow malicious data to reach its destination. Additionally, evasion techniques can
be combined. The purpose of combining evasions is to provide means to evade
detection, for example, if a single evasion technique is not adequate. [40, 49, 66, 80]
The severity of the threat that comes from evasions and evasion combinations
is unclear. It has been reported that these techniques can be utilized to bypass
intrusion prevention systems [4, 36]. However, the extent of the effectiveness of
evasions and evasion combinations needs further studying.
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate if the state of the art intrusion prevention
systems are vulnerable to different evasion techniques and evasion combinations. To
achieve this, four million attacks were run against 10 commercial and 1 free intrusion
prevention systems. Each attack was disguised with different evasion techniques.
Because the magnitude of the experiments is so large, a reliable analysis can be
conducted of the effectiveness of evasion techniques.
2The results show that intrusion prevention systems are vulnerable to evasion
techniques. Even old evasion techniques from the 1990s were still effective against
the state of the art intrusion prevention systems. Only one intrusion prevention
system was able to block all the attacks that were masked with carefully fine-tuned
atomic evasions.
There are millions of evasion combinations that can be utilized in attacks. By
using evasion combinations, almost all the tested intrusion prevention systems can
be tricked into passing malicious data. So, one evasion technique is not always
enough to avoid detection, but combining multiple techniques increases the possi-
bility in finding a way to evade detection. Additionally, the results indicate that
normalization and reassembly have not been properly implemented in some of the
tested intrusion prevention systems because the number of successful attacks utiliz-
ing evasion techniques was so high.
This thesis consists of six chapters. The remainder of the thesis has been orga-
nized in the following way. Chapter 2 introduces to network security. It describes
why there are vulnerabilities in software, lists multiple ways of attacking and how
to protect against various threats. Chapter 3 discusses intrusion prevention sys-
tems and evasions. The main focus is on giving detailed information about how
intrusion prevention systems function and detect and block attacks. Additionally,
evasions are studied to give a thorough understanding about various evasion tech-
niques. Chapter 4 concentrates on the actual study. It describes the environment
where this study was conducted, the used methods and how the experiments were
implemented. Chapter 5 lists the results of the experiments and analyses them. The
last chapter summarizes the results and conclusions that were made in this thesis.
The references used throughout this thesis can be categorized according to the
type of a reference. Mostly peer reviewed articles were used, but also books and
technical specifications were common sources. Also, various product sheets about
intrusion prevention systems and software were used. In limited cases, it is referred
to security blogs or other web sites providing information that was not available in
the previously specified literature.
32 Network Security
Network security is a crucial aspect in information technology. However, it was not
the main concern when the development of the Internet and personal computers
started. This chapter discusses various security threats and lists examples of them.
First, a brief summary of the birth of the Internet is given. Then software vulnera-
bilities and the reasons of their existence are covered. The motives of attackers are
discussed as well as various of types of attacks are studied. Finally, some security
solutions are presented.
2.1 The Birth of the Internet
A key element in the history of the Internet is the development of the ARPANET. It
was a packet switched network funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA). The agency, which was later renamed to DARPA, is an agency of the
United States Department of Defense. In 1969, the first link in the ARPANET was
established between the Stanford Research Institute and the University of California,
Los Angeles. In the early 1980s, TCP/IP protocols were implemented into the
ARPANET. Over the years, the ARPANET was expanded, and the concept of the
Internet started to form. [39, 46]
The main goal of the ARPANET was to share the resources of large service
machines over the network. That is why protocol specifications focused on the oper-
ational behaviour, and security aspects were not the main concern. The environment
was not hostile as it can be described today when various attacks are being deployed
over the Internet. [39]
Technology behind the Internet has evolved, but it still utilizes the core protocols
that were adopted by the ARPANET in the 1980s. Over the years, flaws were found
and fixed to some extent in the protocols and protocol implementations. Some
of the flaws have been very serious threats to the network security. However, the
protocols were effective from the beginning and thus early adopted in production
environments. This led to the current situation where the global economy relies on
them. [21, 39]
2.2 The Sources of Vulnerabilities
According to Internet Security Glossary, vulnerability is "a flaw or weakness in
a system’s design, implementation, or operation and management that could be
exploited to violate the system’s security policy." [71] Attackers try to exploit these
vulnerabilities. Usually, it is done by using exploits. An exploit is a tool that
actually takes advantage of the vulnerability [54]. Its purpose is usually malicious
[25]. The exploit can be, for example, a small script or a dedicated application.
There are a few organizations, including CERT and MITRE, that inform about
vulnerabilities. Also some vendors use security bulletins to provide information
about vulnerabilities. There is a public database available, which is maintained
by MITRE, and it lists publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. The database is called
4Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). Each vulnerability is identified by
a CVE number. [78]
The poor design of software, protocols and algorithms as well as programming
errors are common sources of vulnerabilities, which can be exploited. There are
many programming errors, bugs, in any software. Programmers make mistakes such
as logic errors and errors related to the used resources. An infinite loop is an example
of the former and a buffer overflow of the latter. The buffer overflow happens
when data is written to a buffer, but the boundary of the buffer is overrun, and
adjacent memory is overwritten. Basically, it means that some memory fragments
are modified even though they are supposed to stay untouched by the process.
[27, 78]
According to McConnell, the industry average is 1-25 errors per 1000 lines of
source code [50]. Depending on the size of the software, its source code can contain
even millions of lines. The Linux kernel, for example, has been developed over
20 years. It has been growing during the years of development. Support for new
hardware has been made greater, and new features have been added. The source
code of the Linux kernel version 3.10 contains almost 17 million lines of code. [32]
One of the key design elements in the Internet protocol suite was the robustness
principle [59, 60] that can be expressed as "be conservative in what you do, be lib-
eral in what you accept from others". The correct way of following the robustness
principle can be achieved by always sending well-formed data but accepting any
data that is possible to interpret. It is guaranteed that the interoperation between
different protocol implementations works easily. However, this may lead to differ-
ent interpretations between network security appliances and hosts, which can be
exploited.
One critical aspect is the quality of implementation. If a system is not configured
correctly, it might be vulnerable to attacks that could have been avoided by a
proper configuration. There are many reasons why faulty configurations are in
use. The lack of experience and insufficient training can lead to situations where
configurations are inadequate. Even experienced professionals make mistakes, so
reviewing of configurations is needed. Human aspect cannot be underestimated.
Laziness and carelessness are just some examples of behaviour that can lead to
severe security threats. It is also possible that there are not enough employees and
administrators do not have enough time to thoroughly configure every system, so
corners are cut. [27]
Proper management and monitoring are needed to maintain the level of security.
Security policies and measures need to be documented and monitored. Verifying
that systems are operating as defined is a mandatory practice. [27]
2.3 Attackers
There are many types of online attackers. They also have various motives for their
actions. According to Hyppönen, there are three main groups of attackers which are
criminals, hacktivists and nation states. [43]
First on the list is online criminals. They are motivated by money. It is a known
5fact that cybercrime is a large scale problem [55], and there are many examples
of cybercrime. In 2010, Albert Gonzalez was sentenced to 20 years in prison for
his role in multiple data thefts. A card-processing company, Heartland Payment
Systems, was a victim of theft of over 130 million credit and debit card numbers.
Their system was initially breached by using an SQL injection attack. Gonzalez was
also sentenced for his involvement in a theft of over 90 million credit and debit card
information from TJX and other companies. [3, 90, 91]
Online criminals are well organized, and they can interact with each other. There
are, for example, online forums dedicated to such purposes. In 2012, 24 people were
arrested in an international operation that targeted carding crimes on an under-
cover carding forum. The term, carding, is used to refer to the trafficking of illegally
obtained credit card information. This kind of credit card information can be ac-
quired, for example, by gaining unauthorized access to the database of an online
service. It was estimated that this particular operation prevented a loss of more
than $205 million. It was also revealed that over 400 000 credit and debit cards
were compromised. [9]
Hacktivists want to bring issues they feel important to public attention. Their
motives are political rather than financial gain. Their way of operating varies.
Hacktivists may launch, for example, distributed denial-of-service attacks against
the organizations they are targeting to take their web services oﬄine. This kind of an
attack is covered in detail in the next section. After the United States Department of
Justice shut down a popular file sharing site, Megaupload, as well as other file sharing
sites, a hacktivist collective, Anonymous, started their attack against the parties
involved in the operation. The websites of the FBI, U.S. Department of Justice
and several entertainment industry websites, including Motion Picture Association
of America, were taken oﬄine momentarily in the attack. [41]
Last on the list is nation states and governments. Due to the nature of the
operations, they are not public information. However, it has been documented that
they exist. Stuxnet is an example of a complex piece of malicious software, malware,
sanctioned by nation states. It targeted industrial control systems at the Natanz
plant in Iran, and it is said that due to a programming error, it was able to spread
beyond its initial target [67].
However, there are other attacker groups as well. They have their own unique
characteristics, even though there are similarities with the previously mentioned
groups. Some attackers operate out of curiosity. They want to try to obtain in-
formation they are not supposed to have access. Their motive is not to cause any
severe damage. [78]
Industrial espionage is also happening online. In 2013, a Norwegian telecommu-
nication company, Telenor, reported that a serious data breach happened against
their top executives’ computers. Emails, passwords and a high number of other files
were stolen. Attackers were able to gain access to their network by using Trojans
in email attachments. These emails appeared to come from trusted sources. After
opening this kind of an email attachment, malicious software was covertly installed
in the target system and a backdoor was opened for the attackers. [22]
62.4 Attacks
Attacks are attempts to bypass security services and violate target systems [71].
They can be classified in two categories. A passive attack tries to acquire use-
ful information from a system without affecting it. That is why passive attacks
are difficult to detect. However, encryption is a good way to prevent a data loss.
Eavesdropping and traffic analysis are two examples of passive attacks. They are
also used to gather information that can be used in active attacks. Active attacks
affect the targeted network or system as the name suggests. That is why they are
easier to detect, but they can also be fatal for the functionality of the system. [27]
The following paragraphs list some examples of different active attacks. It is
also considered that attacks can spread because users are not cautious enough. The
timeline of an attack is also studied.
As previously discussed, software contains bugs and vulnerabilities. Various
software vulnerabilities are exploited in attacks against client-side software. Usually,
these attacks are targeted against the software that is wide-spread and used very
commonly. Web browsers, for example, are included in many systems, so they
are intriguing targets for attackers as well as some of the most popular operating
systems. Patching is an important process to prevent the unnecessary exposure of
systems to the attacks against vulnerable software. [27, 78]
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is a well-known way to cause
harm. Its purpose is to prevent users from using the targeted service. In the dis-
tributed denial-of-service attack, the actual attack is deployed from many sources.
It can be achieved, for example, by sending lots of packets, from multiple sources,
which consume a key resource of the service. The DDoS attack will exhaust the
resources of the service so that it will be unavailable for its users. DDoS attacks
may also have great financial implications, for example, if a company cannot provide
their service to their users reliably, some users might switch to another service. [52]
Web servers are targeted because they can have valuable information to attackers.
Databases behind websites can contain confidential data, such as email addresses,
passwords and credit card information. One way of attacking these databases is
using SQL injection attacks. SQL is a language that is used to manage databases
and query data. A website can take a user input from a web form, and it is passed to
an SQL statement that is then executed. If the user input is not properly filtered, it
can allow attackers to embed SQL statements in the input data that are then passed
to the database. By crafting the user input to contain various SQL statements,
attackers may gain restricted information. [78]
The actions of users can have serious consequences. Users may download and
install software from untrusted sources. After installing the software, the system
may seem to operate as previously, but it actually contains a Trojan horse. It
is a malicious piece of software that covertly operates in the background. The
downloaded software does what it promises, but it can also steal the user’s data.
[27]
Attacks are not restricted to be technical. Users are threats to the security of
networks and systems as well as vulnerabilities to software. Users can be convinced
7to reveal confidential information to attackers. This is called social engineering.
An employee can, for example, receive a call from a person who pretends to be from
the IT support of the company. The attacker can use the actual names of people
who are working in the company to be more convincing and gain the trust of the
victim. The attacker can claim that there is a problem with the systems and ask the
employee to help with the issue by performing certain tasks. The employee might
get frustrated after failing to perform the tasks, which are actually impossible to
perform, and start to feel some pressure when the person from the "IT support"
starts complaining. Then the attacker may just ask the username and password of
the employee so that they can finally resolve the problem together and continue to
work with their actual tasks. [27]
Social engineering is used as a way of gaining access to systems by fooling the
victim to reveal confidential information. There are many tricks that can be used
when trying to gather confidential information from the victim. Basically, the tech-
nique is the same as it is with con artists who pretend to be somebody else. It is
important that users know that they are not supposed to disclose their passwords to
anyone. As previously mentioned, all the technical solutions can be hacked without
the knowledge of their way of operating. There is no need to know if the systems
are exposed to certain vulnerabilities if the users are willing to disclose crucial in-
formation quite easily. [27]
Phishing is also a form of social engineering. It means that attackers try to lure
users into giving their personal data by pretending to be a trustworthy entity, such
as a popular web site. Users may receive phishing emails with a link to a website
that looks legitimate, but actually it is a fake. The sender of the email may also
seem to be valid if it is not carefully studied. [78]
The timeline of an attack is shown in Figure 1. There can be two significant
phases in the attack that are illustrated in the figure with large boxes and listed as
A and B, respectively. In the first phase, the box A in the figure, the attack can take
advantage of previously unknown vulnerability. Previously unknown means that no
one has yet disclosed the vulnerability publicly. This type of an attack is called a
zero-day attack.
As seen in Figure 1, after new vulnerability is found (the second small box in
the figure) in software (1), an exploit is created (3). Before the vulnerability is
public (5), a vendor might already have discovered it (4), but it is not necessarily
the case. It is possible that the vendor discovers the vulnerability only after it has
gained publicity. Zero-day attacks are dangerous because products are vulnerable
until the vulnerability is publicly disclosed (5) and patches are implemented and
deployed (6-7). Of course, there are not always zero-day attacks conducted against
each vulnerability because the vulnerability is not discovered by attackers before it
is made public. In such a case, there is only one significant attack phase that begins
after the vulnerability is announced publicly. [24]
The second phase starts when the vulnerability becomes public, which is illus-
trated as a box B in the figure. The developers of the targeted product have to
implement a patch to protect the product against that particular threat, and it
usually takes some time to release it. Meanwhile, if there were zero-day attacks,
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Figure 1: The timeline of an attack
the same attacks tend to continue. They are no longer considered zero-day attacks,
but they are still a serious threat if hosts are not protected. Usually, the number of
attack variants also increases after the publication of the vulnerability. If zero-day
attacks were not conducted, attackers still can try to exploit that particular vulner-
ability, since all of the hosts may not be patched or protected. Theoretically, after
the patch is deployed to every host, the attack becomes pointless. It also means
that the window of exposure is closed. [24]
In a recent study, Bilge and Dumitras stated that the duration of zero-day attacks
varies from days to years, and they last 10 months on average. This means the
duration between the first time an attack is conducted and the vulnerability is
publicly disclosed. Although most of the zero-day attacks are targeted against few
target systems, sometimes the magnitude can be larger. For example, the Conficker
worm infected hundreds of thousands target systems before it was detected. [24]
Previously mentioned Stuxnet is an example of a targeted attack. It is a complex
piece of malware, which exploited four different zero-day vulnerabilities. [37] It is
considered a high-profile attack. [24]
2.5 Security Solutions
There is a need to protect hosts that are connected to the Internet. These hosts may
be, for example, desktop computers or servers. Entire network segments including
private company networks (intranet) need protection. That is why intrusion pre-
vention systems (IPS) and firewalls were developed to improve the network security.
These devices can be used to protect large networks or just a single host. [75]
An intrusion prevention system is used for identifying and logging malicious
content in network traffic. Its most important function is to stop malicious content
from reaching its destinations. [69] Section 3.1 discusses intrusion prevention systems
in detail.
A firewall is a security system that limits network access. It can be software or
a separate device. It analyses incoming and outgoing network traffic and filters the
traffic according to its rules. Firewalls can also be deployed to the host itself, for
example, operation systems can include a firewall. [30]
Firewalls have developed over time from packet filters to rather complex next-
generation firewalls. There are four groups of firewalls that are briefly studied in
the following paragraphs. All the firewall groups are presented in the chronological
order of the development. [30, 87]
9First firewall solutions were rather simple packet filters. A packet filter operates
by dropping packets that match its rule sets. The rule sets include a combination
of the source and destination addresses of a packet, a protocol that is used and port
numbers. Packet filters do not keep track on the information about a connection
state. They make decisions based on the current packet. Thus, it is not taken
into consideration whether the packet is a part of an existing stream. Packet filters
operate up to the network layer of OSI model, but they also operate at the transport
layer because they need access to port numbers. [30]
Stateful firewalls operate as packet filters, but they also keep track on the state
of connections. They operate at the transport layer of OSI model to be able to
inspect connection states. Stateful firewalls determine if a packet is used to open a
new connection, or if it is part of an existing connection. It is dropped if it is not a
part of any connection, and it is not opening a new connection. [30]
Application layer firewalls operate, as the name suggests, up to the application
layer of OSI model. An application layer firewall has the functionalities of a stateful
filter, but it is also able to understand various application layer protocols, such as the
HTTP protocol. It makes possible to block connections if the semantics of a protocol
is not followed properly, or a disallowed protocol tries to bypass the application layer
firewall using an allowed port. [30]
A next-generation firewall extends the functionalities of an application layer fire-
wall by integrating the functionalities of an intrusion prevention system. Next-
generation firewalls are application-aware solutions that are capable of performing
deep packet inspection. This technique is studied in Section 3.2.3. [87]
A simplified example of the differences between firewalls and intrusion prevention
systems is the way they operate. Firewalls block all network traffic except the
network traffic that is explicitly allowed. Intrusion prevention systems permit all
network traffic except the network traffic that is considered malicious and therefore
explicitly disallowed.
Antivirus software is used to protect hosts from being infected by malware. It
is also used to scan systems for the presence of malware. In case of an infection,
antivirus software is responsible for removing the malicious content out of the sys-
tem. Antivirus software provides protection against various threats, not just against
viruses as implied by the term. There are also various commercial and free solutions
available. [78]
2.6 Summary
Security was not the main concern when the Internet protocol suite was designed.
The environment was not as hostile as it is nowadays. Also, the goal of the prede-
cessor of the Internet, the ARPANET, was to share resources over the network, and
thus security was initially overlooked.
Systems have weaknesses, vulnerabilities, in their design, implementation or op-
eration and management. Their severities vary but they exist. Reasons for vulnera-
bilities can be, for example, the poor design of software or programming errors. Also,
the quality of implementation has a significant role. Systems need to be properly
10
configured to avoid unnecessary exposure.
Attackers exploit these vulnerabilities. There are three main groups of attack-
ers that are criminals, hacktivists and nation states. Various types of attacks are
implemented including DDoS attacks and SQL injections. A zero-day attack takes
advantage of previously unknown vulnerability, which makes it difficult to detect
such attacks.
There are various security solutions available to improve the network security.
Intrusion prevention systems, firewalls and antivirus software were developed to
protect hosts and networks from attackers.
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3 Intrusion Prevention
This chapter studies intrusion prevention systems in detail and discusses how this
type of devices operate and detect attacks. An overview of different evasion tech-
niques is presented with a note how these techniques can be put together to create
evasion combinations. Some tools are also listed that can be used to test various eva-
sion techniques against intrusion prevention systems. Finally, research is presented
that is relevant to this thesis.
3.1 Intrusion Prevention Systems
An intrusion prevention system is a network security appliance that is used for
identifying and logging malicious content in network traffic and the most importantly
stopping it from reaching its destination. Intrusion prevention systems work inline,
so the network traffic goes through an IPS device. IPS devices are also capable of
producing summarizing reports about the monitored threats. [69]
Intrusion prevention systems can be categorized as an extension to intrusion
detection systems (IDS). An IDS is able to identify and log malicious content in
network traffic, but it does not necessarily try to prevent any attacks. Intrusion
detection systems are passive systems that get a copy of the network traffic which
can then be monitored and logged. Thus, an IDS is used to monitor the network
traffic. [69]
IPS
Event log
Definition 
database
Sensor
Detection & 
blocking
Management 
interface
Management 
& monitoring 
(internal or 
external)
Figure 2: The components of an IPS
The components of an IPS can be seen in Figure 2. Intrusion prevention systems
use sensors or agents to monitor and analyse the network traffic. They try to detect
malicious content in the network traffic by using various detection methods. Devices
contain, for example, a definition database of malicious content that is used in the
detection process to determine if the data is legal or not. Since the network traffic
goes through an IPS device, it is also able to prevent attacks by blocking them. Also,
a log of the detected events is stored in a database. Devices can be administrated via
a management interface. For example, updates can be installed via this interface.
Some devices have an external management server, which receives information from
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the sensors. The management and monitoring capabilities can also be internal. Then
the IPS is a stand-alone device. [69]
Intrusion detection systems have been commercially available from the 1990s
[85]. Since there were appliances available, there were always techniques to outsmart
them. As an illustration of the situation Fred Cohen published an article mentioning
50 ways to defeat intrusion detection systems in 1997 [31]. So, basically from the
beginning of the industry, it has been seen that intrusion detection systems and
intrusion prevention systems might be vulnerable to different tactics even though
they bring additional security to the environment where they are deployed.
The process of mistakenly declaring clean network traffic as malicious (or mali-
cious traffic as clean) is called having false positives (or false negatives), respectively
[69]. Having lots of false positive results in a detection process can be potentially
dangerous because it is very difficult to find an actual attack if the log is full of
entries. For example, if an administrator has a reason to believe that the log is full
of false positives, the administrator might allow all the previously blocked network
traffic of that type. The decision might be based on the fact that the network traffic
causing the alarms was created by certain software that is previously known to be
valid. The problem is that the decision may open the door for attacks too. False
positives can also cause inconvenience to the authorized users since their legal traffic
may be blocked without a proper reason. This can happen, for example, if the qual-
ity of signatures or rules is somewhat questionable in intrusion prevention systems.
The use of signatures is covered in Section 3.2.1.
A false negative can be dangerous because then the device passes malicious
content through. This can happen due to many reasons, for instance, the device
might not have up-to-date rules and signatures, it does not perform proper traffic
normalization, or it lacks resources to perform thorough analysis.
False positives were a problem in the early years of intrusion detection [69].
Devices generated a large number of alerts that made it difficult to notice an actual
attack from the log [53]. Administrators also needed to spend lots of time fine-
tuning the system. IDS stimulator tools, for example, Stick [53], PCP [56] and Snot
[53, 56], were developed to generate network traffic that triggers lots of alerts in
the IDS systems. These tools used signatures from an open source system, Snort,
to create the traffic in the way it would cause the alerts. [53, 56] In 2003, Gartner
research company stated that "intrusion detection systems are a market failure".
One of the reasons behind the argument was that devices generate too much false
alarms. Devices also had problems with detecting attacks. [2] Nowadays intrusion
prevention systems are improved from the early years, and false positives are not
such an issue [69].
Intrusion prevention systems1 are traditionally either network-based or host-
1From now on, unless stated otherwise, the term IPS is used throughout this thesis to unify
the used terminology. The main operation and detection mechanisms between intrusion detection
systems and intrusion prevention systems are the same, and the only big difference between the
devices is that an IPS is also capable of preventing attacks. Also, the term IPS is used when
referring to papers published before IPS devices were publicly available because the papers refer
to detection mechanisms.
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based, but there are other solutions available, such as wireless intrusion prevention
systems and network behavior analysis systems (NBA). A network-based intrusion
prevention system is commonly a stand-alone, possibly rack-mounted, appliance
that is placed in the network to monitor and prevent attacks for certain network
segments. This type of devices can be deployed, for example, near border firewalls or
routers. A host-based intrusion prevention system is usually deployed to the host
itself. It is responsible for monitoring and preventing attacks against that particular
host. A wireless intrusion prevention system is used to monitor wireless network
traffic. It analyses wireless protocols to detect malicious activity. It can also be used
to detect rogue access points and rogue wireless networks. A network behavior
analysis system tries to detect threats that cause uncommon network traffic flows,
for example, distributed denial-of-service attacks. [69]
Nowadays virtualization is one of the key elements in information technology.
To follow that trend, vendors have also published virtualized intrusion prevention
systems [12, 15, 16]. Additionally, there are also other types of appliances, such as
unified threat management solutions [89] and next-generation firewalls [87] that are
capable of performing tasks which are traditionally assigned to intrusion prevention
systems.
3.2 Detection Methods
Intrusion prevention systems can use multiple detection methods including signature-
based detection, statistical anomaly-based detection and stateful protocol analysis.
Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.3 discuss more these methods. Intrusion prevention sys-
tems usually utilize multiple detection methods in order to perform as well as pos-
sible. Different detection methods can be used separately or in an integrated way.
[69]
3.2.1 Signature-based Detection
A signature is a predefined pattern that corresponds to a threat. A pattern can be,
for example, a specific piece of a string that describes uniquely the characteristics of
an attack. A simplified example of the pattern can be a string containing the text
"attack.exe", which is found in the attachment field of an email, where this text
refers to a known filename of a virus. [69]
Intrusion prevention systems have a database that contains signatures against a
variety of threats. In signature-based detection, an IPS tries to match the network
traffic against these signatures to detect and prevent attacks. [69] The quality of
the process depends on how well the signatures have been defined [80]. Also, the
capability of reassembling and normalizing the traffic correctly is important [29].
The signatures should be based on vulnerability instead of an exploit. Not all
the attacks are entirely new. Instead, they can be based on a previously known
exploit. Exploit-based signatures are very ineffective against different variations of
an exploit because the new variation of an attack does not match against the old
signature. [23, 25, 82] For example, if the filename of the previously mentioned
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virus was changed from "attack.exe" to attack2.exe", it could not be detected by
the same exploit-based rule [69]. Vulnerability-based signatures try to understand
the vulnerability in order to be able to block all the attacks trying to exploit that
particular vulnerability. In that way, only one properly made signature against
vulnerability is enough to block all the different attack variations, even polymorphic
variants, using that vulnerability. [25]
Signature-based detection is considered an effective method of detecting pre-
viously known threats [69]. However, it has some weaknesses. It cannot detect
zero-day attacks because an IPS does not have the signatures of zero-day attacks
until the vendor releases them and the signature database of the device is updated
[85]. Sometimes it is considered that signature-based detection includes stateful
protocol analysis, which is discussed in Section 3.2.3 [69].
3.2.2 Statistical Anomaly-based Detection
Statistical anomaly-based detection means that an IPS can detect incidents by com-
paring network traffic against the definitions of the network traffic which is consid-
ered normal. IPS devices are trained over the time to understand what kind of traffic
is normal in that particular network or host. IPS devices have profiles that contain
representations of normal behaviour of different types of instances, for example,
network connections, hosts and applications. [69]
In this type of detection, an IPS analyses by using statistical methods whether
the traffic falls within the correct thresholds according to the profiles it uses. The
profiles can be either static or dynamic. A static profile remains the same after
initializing it, but dynamic profiles develop over the time. The static profile can be
a good choice if the nature of the network traffic is not going to change. [69]
Anomaly-based detection methods can be used to detect zero-day attacks, which
is considered one of the advantages of this type of detection. When signature-based
detection relies on proper signatures, anomaly-based detection can notice significant
deviations in network traffic that might be caused by an attack. One of the problems
with anomaly-based detection is that it may cause many false positives because legal
activity may differ from the profile representations. For example, each time a new
application is taken into use in the network, the network traffic might change just
enough to cause false positives. [69]
3.2.3 Stateful Protocol Analysis
Stateful protocol analysis means that network traffic is compared in each protocol
state against the definitions of the network traffic which is considered normal by
vendors. The basis of stateful protocol analysis is the use of the universal, vendor-
made, profiles of normal and valid protocol operation. The analysis is also stateful, so
it is able to keep track of the protocol state. Thus, attackers cannot exploit different
protocols by performing actions that are not allowed or valid in that particular
protocol state. [69]
The protocol models that are used in stateful protocol analysis usually follow pro-
tocol definitions by software vendors and standardisation authorities, for example,
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Request for Comments (RFCs) from Internet Engineering Task Force. The models
also need to take into consideration that protocol implementations may differ. Also,
the use of proprietary protocols makes the detection process more difficult because
vendors usually do not have all the details and semantics of a proprietary protocol.
[69]
Stateful protocol inspection is an effective way to detect attacks, but it also
consumes lots of resources. The analysing process is quite complex, and the heavier
network load, the more demanding it is to keep on track of the increasing number
of different connections and their states. Also, the term deep packet inspection is
sometimes used to refer to stateful protocol analysis. [69]
3.3 Evasions
Evasions are techniques to masquerade attacks to avoid detection by security appli-
ances. Basically, with the help of evasions, attackers try to mask the attacks so that
security appliances are not able to detect and block them. [61]
There are a lot of techniques for evading IPS devices [28, 61, 62], and these
different evasion techniques can also be combined to create new successful attacks.
This process of combining evasion techniques was considerably studied in the 2000s.
[40, 49, 66, 80] Evasion techniques are also known by names such as variations [49]
and transformations [66].
Figure 3 illustrates a simplified situation of attacks with and without evasions.
First, an attacker wants to exploit a vulnerable service but does not apply evasion
techniques when trying to deliver the exploit to the target system. The IPS device
is able to block the attack. Second, the attacker uses the same exploit, but this time
evasions are also deployed. Now the IPS device just sees legal data and passes all the
data to the vulnerable target system. In the target system, the data is interpreted
correctly, and that is why the exploit can be run. Now the attacker can have, for
example, a control over the vulnerable service or even the target system.
Attacker IPS Target
IPS detects the exploit
and drops the packet
Target with a 
vulnerable service
Exploit Exploit
X
OK
Attacker sends a packet 
which contains an exploit
Attacker masks the packet 
containing the exploit with 
evasions Exploit Exploit
IPS assumes that the 
packet is clean
Exploit
Target reads the 
packet and the 
exploit is run
Figure 3: An attack masked with evasions
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The robustness principle makes it possible to exploit the fact that all the received
traffic is always interpreted [10, 60]. The evasion techniques come in the picture be-
cause intrusion prevention systems and end-systems may not always interpret or
process the incoming data similarly [61]. So, even though the robustness principle
brings interoperability between devices, it also causes problems with different inter-
pretations. Different protocols have numerous possible options and parameters that
are not used very often, so it is possible that different devices end up having differ-
ently interpreted data steams. Attackers may also craft the network traffic without
following the correct protocol semantics since, according to the robustness principle,
the end-systems still have to try to interpret all the incoming traffic. [10, 60, 61, 68]
It should be noted that evasions are not restricted to uncommon protocol options.
Much used protocol features can be used as well to try to bypass the IPS detection
mechanisms. For example, TCP has mechanisms, such as flow control and congestion
control, for ensuring reliability and a good performance through different networks.
Even these aspects can be exploited [7]. Additionally, the capabilities of intrusion
prevention systems are not unlimited, so it is possible that a device misses an attack
because it lacks resources when reassembling the data [29].
Many of the evasive techniques can be categorized according to the way they
operate. In Sections 3.3.1 through 3.3.4, a few techniques are listed that can be
used for evading IPS devices or other security appliances. It is worth noticing that
some of the categorized techniques may be slightly overlapping with each other.
3.3.1 Denial-of-Service and Timing Attacks
Denial-of-service attacks are used to overwhelm all the available resources of an IPS,
such as the memory and CPU usage [65]. There are a few possible outcomes when
the denial-of-service attacks succeed. Devices might start operating in a fail-closed
state where they block all the traffic or go to a fail-open state where they pass all
the traffic. [61] Resource exhaustion makes it possible that an attack goes through
an IPS undetected [57, 73]. For example, the rule matching algorithms of the IPS
can be exploited so that packet processing times slow down significantly. Then the
device might be too busy to handle everything properly. [73] The use of denial-of-
service attacks is a very visible way to attack since its primary purpose is to make
the attacked resource unavailable [65]. It can be used to evade an IPS device, but
other techniques provide stealth approaches. [57]
Timing attacks are managed by delaying the sending of packets and exploiting
different timeouts between intrusion prevention systems and end-systems. It is pos-
sible that by delaying packets an IPS device might lose the track of the stream
because the detection process takes too much time. In that case, when receiving
the next new packet after timeout, the IPS device decides to pass the data. The
data is clean itself, but when it is combined with the previously received data in the
end-system, it is malicious. [26, 72]
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3.3.2 Uncommon Protocol Fields
The use of uncommon protocol fields is a way for evading intrusion prevention sys-
tems [10]. As previously mentioned, IPS devices and end-systems do not always
interpret or process all the incoming data similarly [61]. That is why it is possible
to exploit the use of uncommon and rarely used protocol fields. Since some of the
protocol fields are rarely used, they are not implemented consistently into every
device, and the handling of this kind of data may be different [69]. Also, the ro-
bustness principle requires that all the devices at least try to interpret the incoming
traffic [59, 60]. Different evasion techniques using uncommon protocol fields can be
deployed, for example, with TCP [84? ].
Attackers can also deliberately violate some of the protocol semantics [61]. This
tactic is quite widely used since there are lots of attacks targeting a specific protocol
[23, 28]. The more complex protocol, the more difficult it is to interpret correctly by
any device, and therefore intrusion prevention systems are required to have a deep
understanding about different protocols to be able to make right interpretations
and decisions [69]. Server Message Block (SMB) protocol an example of a complex
protocol that can be targeted with many different evasion techniques [7, 28, 36].
3.3.3 Packet Splitting Techniques
Packet splitting techniques are used to exploit the fact that IPS devices are not
always able to reassemble data streams correctly [57, 61]. Due to limited buffer sizes
intrusion prevention systems may not have enough resources to correctly reassemble
all the incoming data to detect possible attacks if packets are split to, for example,
small fragments or segments. Basically, in this case an IPS device tries to match the
incoming data against attack signatures, but it is not able to find anything malicious
or even suspicious since the data is not properly reassembled. [29]
Packet splitting techniques are also widely deployed with duplicate insertion
techniques. Duplicate insertion means the use of duplicate or overlapping segments
or fragments. [61] An illustration of an attack with duplicate fragments is shown in
Figure 4 [61, 72]. In this example, the data, sent from the attacker, is split into five
fragments. First, the attacker sends successfully fragments 1 to 4. In order to fool
the intrusion prevention system, the attacker sends again fragments 3 and 4, but
this time the payload differs from the previous data although all the header fields
remain the same. Finally, the attacker sends the last fragment. In this example, the
IPS device is not able to reassemble the data stream like the target system. The
IPS device just ignores the latest fragments, which are duplicates, and reassembles
the data by only using the original fragments. That is why it sees just some legal
data. The end-system reassembles the data by using the latest fragments instead
of the original fragments. Thus, the end-system reassembles totally different data
steam, and the content is malicious. [61]
Like stated previously, it is possible to send overlapping fragments. It means that
the IP header offset values are ambiguous so that, for example, a newly received frag-
ment may actually partly or fully overwrite an earlier fragment. The key is, again,
to reassemble the data correctly. These kinds of packet splitting techniques can be
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Figure 4: Evasion with duplicate fragments
applied to IP with the use of fragmentation. These techniques also work similarly
with TCP when using segmentation. There are also lots of various techniques, that
can be used, including sending fragments or segments out-of-order or splitting them
to different sizes. [61] Different operation systems can also reassemble fragments
differently, which can create challenges for intrusion prevention systems. They can
favour, for example, the first received fragment for each offset in the packet or the
last received fragment. [70]
Additionally, time to live (TTL) values can be used to evade the IPS detection
mechanisms. With the help of duplicate segments and too small TTL values, it is
possible that some of the segments get dropped before reaching the end-system, but
the segments with long enough TTL values are able to reach it. [57, 61]
3.3.4 Obfuscation and Encryption
Obfuscation means that, for example, a piece of code is turned into looking entirely
different, but it still functions the same way as before [36]. Usually different ob-
fuscation methods are used to hide an attack payload, for example, a shellcode, in
order to make it difficult for IPS devices to catch the attack [80]. In that case, an
IPS device cannot any more rely on its own attack fingerprints because the new,
obfuscated attack has an entirely different fingerprint [38]. It is also possible to
use different encoding techniques to transform a payload to look different. This is
usually done, for instance, when the true meaning of an HTTP request is wanted to
hide. [63, 80]
Encrypting the data or the use of tunnels provides means for evading an IPS
device [31]. Encryption is an important aspect to provide secure network communi-
cation between hosts. It is generally used in many good ways, but it also makes it
difficult for intrusion prevention systems to inspect data streams and detect attacks
since they cannot really do a proper analysis of the data. This can be achieved with
the help of various tunneling technologies. Of course, the use of tunnels demands
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that an attacker is able to establish a secure connection, for example, an SSH tunnel,
to the target system or network. [26]
3.3.5 Tools
Many tools have been released that can be used for testing security appliances
against evasive techniques. These tools usually contain components that are shown
in Figure 5. They are able to generate network traffic including certain attacks that
are masked with a user-defined evasion technique or multiple evasion techniques.
Some tools do not contain any attacks but just craft the network traffic with evasions,
originating from the local host to the target host [74]. Tools also have a management
interface, so users can select the attacks and evasions or possibly create automatized
attacks. The following paragraphs list many tools that can be used to test IPS
devices.
Evasion 
Database
Attack 
Database
Management Interface
Traffic 
Generation
Figure 5: The common components of evasion tools
Fragroute is a testing tool, by Dug Song, which implemented IP and TCP
protocol evasions, such as IP fragmentation and TCP segmentation [74]. It is also
capable of combining user-specified evasions [66, 74]. In 1999, Rain Forest Puppy
released a tool, whisker, that introduced application layer evasions using HTTP
protocol [62]. A web scanner, Nikto, also uses whisker’s libraries to include its
functionalities [76]. A program called SideStep, which was implemented by Robert
Graham, contained FTP evasion techniques that made it possible to exploit an
FTP command stream by inserting Telnet control sequences into the stream [80].
ADMmutate was the first tool that utilized a polymorphic technique to mutate
a shellcode for evading signature-based intrusion prevention systems. Afterwards
other solutions of this type were also implemented [34]. A penetration test tool,
Metasploit, also has capabilities to evade IPS detection [13].
There are many tools implemented combining different evasion techniques to
create new modified attacks. Thor, released in 2002, is an automated tool sup-
porting attack variations, which can be used to try to evade intrusion prevention
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systems [49]. In 2004, Vigna et al. [80] published a paper describing a more so-
phisticated framework, later named as Sploit [19], which is capable of generating
mutant exploits. The framework used different evasion techniques at multiple layers
(network, application and exploit) that were combined to create lots of variations
of exploits to test the signatures of intrusion prevention systems. AGENT is an
automated tool including transport and application layer evasions to combine new
attacks. The paper describing the architecture of AGENT was also published in
2004. [66] In the same year, Gorton and Champion [40] continued Min G. Kang’s
work by doing some modifications to the previously released Mendax IDS evasion
program. They concluded that even if intrusion prevention systems are able to catch
all the attacks using only one evasion technique at the time, they still cannot always
detect the attacks disguised with the same evasions when combining them together.
In 2008, another solution called idsprobe, which is capable of combining multilayer
evasions, was released [44].
In 2010, a security company called Stonesoft gained publicity by discovering
Advanced Evasion Techniques (AETs) [5]. They were defined as "any evasive hacking
techniques that allow an intruder to bypass security detection during a network-
based attack" [1]. Later, in 2012, Stonesoft published a tool [7, 11], Evader, which
was designed for testing network security devices against these techniques.
The idea behind AETs is to simultaneously execute different evasion techniques
possibly at several OSI layers with different protocols [1]. By combining different
evasion techniques and changing their parameters it is possible to create millions of
different evasion combinations. Intrusion prevention systems are required to do a
proper normalization in order to be able to detect attacks that are tried to mask
with these techniques. [7, 11] The Evader tool was used throughout this study.
3.4 Evasion Research
Evasions have been a well-known issue in the network security industry for a long
time [57, 61]. In 1998, Ptacek and Newsham published a seminal paper about evad-
ing network intrusion prevention systems with the help of many different techniques
including IP fragmentation, overlapping IP fragments and TCP segmentation. Their
main focus was on network and transport layer evasions, namely, TCP and IP eva-
sions. The basis of these kinds of attacks relied on the fact that intrusion prevention
systems and end-systems may not always process or interpret the incoming packets
similarly [61].
In 1998, roughly when the paper of Ptacek and Newsham was published, Paxson
also presented some of the same techniques in his pioneering paper [57, 61]. Even
today some of the relatively old techniques presented in the studies of Paxson or
Ptacek and Newsham are valid for evading IPS devices [29, 36].
It has been proposed that fragmentation can also cause problems in IPv6 [18].
Fragmentation is only allowed by source nodes in IPv6 and not by intermediary
devices like in IPv4 [33]. It is also recommended that overlapping IPv6 fragments
should be disallowed to prevent any foul play [45].
Evasion techniques are not restricted to network and transport layers, but also
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other protocols from different OSI layers are proven to be vulnerable [28]. In 2006
at Black Hat USA conference, Caswell and Moore [28] demonstrated that evasions
are possible at every OSI layer. There are possible evasion techniques even at data
link layer although it is not very practical to use them because local media access is
needed. In the same conference Caswell and Moore presented already known evasion
techniques, but also some new SMB and DCE/RPC protocol evasion techniques were
studied [23, 28].
Evasions of application layer protocols, such as HTTP, are a well-documented
topic. In 1999, Rain Forest Puppy published a pioneering paper concentrating on
HTTP evasion techniques [62]. The idea behind these techniques was to mutate an
HTTP request in a way that IPS devices do not understand the true meaning of
the request, but the end-system still interprets it right. A classic example of this
behaviour is an HTTP request that is encoded so that its string representation seems
to be valid because it does not match against any known signatures of an IPS. For
instance, a character ’i’ can be encoded as ’%69’ in the request, and if the IPS is
not able to decode it as ’i’, the IPS fails to understand the request correctly.
Later, Rain Forest Puppy continued his work by stating the problems of UTF-8
Unicode encoding with requests [63]. Before that, mainly evasions of ASCII encoding
had been under thorough investigation in the intrusion prevention systems. This
work was extended by Daniel Roelker who evaluated two different types of HTTP
evasion techniques. Those techniques were invalid protocol field decoding and invalid
protocol parsing. The previously given example of encoding falls into the former
category. The latter means that an IPS is not able to parse the request correctly
which can happen, for example, when multiple requests are pipelined to a single
request.
Usually, an attack can be divided into a few parts. First, you need to know
the vulnerability to take advantage of and select an exploit against it. This way
it is possible to enter the target system undetected. Second, you need to inject
a shellcode to the attack payload. The shellcode is a piece of code carried in the
attack payload that is run in the target system, for example, to gain remote access
to the system. Third, you need to encode the payload, which can be done by using
some shellcode encoding method. Encoding is done to avoid the signature-based
detection of the shellcode. So, different obfuscation techniques can be used to try
to hide the payload of the attack. Additionally, evasions can be used to mask the
execution of the attack. [13, 61]
Obfuscation techniques at the exploit layer usually apply polymorphism or dif-
ferent encoding techniques [80]. Polymorphism is a technique to mutate a piece of
code to look different each time it is run, but it still functions the way it did before
mutating. With the help of polymorphism, attackers can be able to evade intru-
sion prevention systems’ pattern matching techniques since they do not necessarily
recognize the signatures after a mutation. Polymorphic engines are used to create
a polymorphic shellcode. Even though polymorphic techniques were able to evade
signature-based detection systems, anomaly-based systems detected these attacks
because of the statistical anomalies they caused. Fogla et al. introduced polymor-
phic blending attacks in order to make these attacks look like normal traffic so that
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anomaly-based intrusion prevention systems would not catch them. [38]
Various countermeasures have been proposed against evasions. In 1999, Paxson
and Handley [42] suggested that traffic normalization combined with reassembly
could be used against the exploiting of protocol ambiguities. The purpose of traffic
normalization is to eliminate potential protocol ambiguities so that the interpreted
network traffic is seen in the same way by the intrusion prevention system and the
target host. Several other studies about traffic normalization were also conducted
[81, 83]. An entirely different approach [17, 79] was also suggested where reassem-
bly does not occur. Then, the signatures of intrusion prevention systems are split
into shorter strings, and those partial signatures are tried to match against the
small segments of network traffic. The benefit of this technique is lower memory
consumption. Besides these methods, some alternative techniques [64, 70, 77] were
presented where an intrusion prevention system tries to interpret the network traffic
in the same way as the target host with the help and information it receives from
the target host or infers from the network traffic.
As discussed earlier, for example, HTTP requests can be encoded to look differ-
ent. The process of decoding and normalizing these requests is an important part
of detecting any misbehaviour. It has been also suggested that an IPS can work
together with a web server so that the web server sends the requests back to the
IPS in the format the server sees them [35].
The detection of a polymorphic shellcode can be problematic as previously dis-
cussed. However, there is a solution available that utilizes network-level emulation
to overcome the issues [58]. A CPU emulator can be embedded in an intrusion pre-
vention system where it executes all the potential instruction sequences in order to
detect a specific behaviour that indicates the presence of a polymorphic shellcode.
Bania [20] has addressed some limitations of this technique.
Since the security of intrusion prevention systems and the implications of differ-
ent evasion techniques are topics that interest many parties, many different evalu-
ations of intrusion prevention systems have been conducted. One well-known actor
in evaluations was the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) who
funded two different evaluations of intrusion prevention systems in 1998 and 1999
[47, 48]. The later study included evasion techniques [47], but the DARPA evalua-
tions were also criticized to be questionable regarding the test methodologies, which
could have led to biased results [51]. Nowadays different independent organizations
evaluate security devices, including intrusion prevention systems. NSS Labs and
ICSA Labs, for example, are such evaluators.
Recently some studies were published about evasions against intrusion prevention
systems, but they were restricted to a relatively limited number of evasion techniques
or commercial IPS devices [29, 36]. However, there is a recent study available with
a large number of tested commercial intrusion prevention systems, but the number
of attacks, containing various evasions, ran against IPS devices is very limited [86].
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3.5 Summary
This chapter studied intrusion prevention systems and their functionalities. An IPS
is used for identifying and logging malicious content in network traffic. The most
important functionality of the IPS is stopping malicious content from reaching its
destination.
Evasions are techniques to masquerade attacks to avoid detection by security
appliances. There are lots of different techniques that can be used for evading
detection. Basically, with the help of evasions, attackers try to mask the attacks so
that security appliances are not able to detect and block them. Different evasion
techniques can also be combined to create new successful attacks. The process of
combining evasion techniques was considerably studied in the 2000s.
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4 Methods and Implementation
This chapter discusses the hardware and the software that were used in the experi-
ments. The methods are also studied which were used to create reliable experiments
as well as the actual implementation of the experiments is explained.
4.1 Environment
The environment of the study needs to match certain criteria in order to evaluate
the effectiveness of evasion techniques against intrusion prevention systems. Sections
4.1.1 through 4.1.3 cover the used network topology, the intrusion prevention systems
that were tested in the study and the software which was needed to perform the
experiments.
4.1.1 Network Topology
The small testing network consisted of the attacker computer, the IPS device, which
was under test, and the target computer, which ran vulnerable software. The net-
work topology is shown in Figure 6. The attacker and the target computers were
both connected to the intrusion prevention system, which is called the device under
test (DUT). Every DUT operated as an inline layer-2 device. That is the reason why
only the management port of the DUT required an IP address. The attacker and
the target computers had fixed IP addresses. The target computer was virtualized,
in order to be able to restore the initial state of the systems, when starting every
test. Oracle VM VirtualBox was used as virtual machine software, and promiscuous
mode was enabled.
Attacker
Ubuntu 12.04
DUT
Target
Virtualized
Ubuntu 12.04 &
Windows XP SP2
Figure 6: The used network topology
25
4.1.2 Hardware
In total, 11 intrusion prevention systems were tested, 10 commercial and 1 free and
open source solution called Snort. The selected IPS devices contain, for example,
all the leaders and challengers of the network intrusion prevention system market
according to Gartner [88]. All the tested devices and their software versions are
listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Tested IPS devices and their software versions
IPS Software Version
Check Point UTM-1 270 634131022
Cisco IPS-4240 7.1.(5)E4
Fortigate FG800 V4.0, build0646
HP Tipping Point 110 2.5.5.6994
IBM Proventia GX4004 33.050
Juniper SSG 320M & IDP 75 IDP 5.1.139197
McAfee M-1450 7.5.3.11
Palo Alto PA-500 5.0.0
Snort 2.9.5.3, Snapshot-2950
SourceFire 3D Sensor 2100 4.10.2.7-708, VDB 169
Stonesoft StoneGate 1302 5.4.5, Update Package 527
4.1.3 Software
This study utilized Stonesoft Evader and Mongbat. Both of the tools are covered in
the following paragraphs.
Stonesoft Evader
Stonesoft Evader2 [7, 11] was used throughout this study to test the vulnerability
of intrusion prevention systems against different evasion techniques and combina-
tions. It is a vulnerability scanner, which was released by a security company called
Stonesoft at Black Hat security conference in June 2012. Even though it contains
exploits, it is not a penetration test tool. Its main purpose is to test if well-known
exploits can be disguised, with the help of evasion techniques, in a way that an
intrusion prevention system is not able to detect them. Evader has its own TCP/IP
stack that makes it possible to generate network traffic which can possibly enter the
target host undetected. Evader itself is a command line tool, but there is a graphical
web interface available too.
Currently, the latest version of Evader contains three different exploits (using
the vulnerabilities of CVE-2004-1315, CVE-2008-4250 and CVE-2012-0002) and 35
2Evader can be downloaded freely from Stonesoft’s Evader web page.
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different atomic evasions. The evasions can be applied to different, and also to the
same, OSI layers simultaneously. In Evader there are 15 different evasions available
for all the three exploits, using network and transport layers.
The exploit implementation using the vulnerability of CVE-2004-1315, which is
called HTTP phpBB Highlight in Evader, has additionally 9 application layer eva-
sions using HTTP protocol. The exploit using the CVE-2008-4250 vulnerability,
which is called Conficker, has 11 evasions for MSRPC, NetBIOS and SMB proto-
cols. For exploit using the CVE-2012-0002 vulnerability, there are not any additional
atomic evasions available. In this study two different exploits were used, the Con-
ficker exploit against Windows XP and HTTP phpBB Highlight against Ubuntu.
These two exploits were used because the preference is to test the ability of the IPS
devices to detect attacks using evasions at as many OSI layers as possible.
Evader supports payload obfuscation. In Evader obfuscation means that the
used shellcode encoder is not static in every attack. IPS devices can detect used
shellcode encoders, so Evader tries to create a new, randomized shellcode encoder
for every attack. When obfuscation is disabled, Evader usually uses well-known
shellcode encoders from Metasploit, for example, the Conficker exploit uses Metas-
ploit based Fnstenv/mov shellcode encoder. Since Fnstenv/mov is a well-known
shellcode encoder, it is possible for IPS devices to detect it from the stream by using
signature-based detection. For example, Snort has a shellcode rule for it [14].
Mongbat
Mongbat [7] is a fuzz testing tool, which comes with the Evader package. Mongbat
makes it possible to run multiple Evader instances in parallel. It also randomizes
the used evasion techniques and the evasion parameters for every attack against the
target host so that every attack is at least somewhat different. Attacks can use either
one evasion technique at the time or combine multiple evasion techniques. Every
attack also has its own parameters that can be adjusted, for instance, two attacks
with the same evasion combinations are entirely different because the parameters of
the evasions differ in the attacks.
Mongbat was the primary test tool in this study. It was used to run a million
attacks, with a different set of evasion combinations and parameters, against each
IPS device.
4.2 Methods
The methods used for creating the experiments are discussed in the following sec-
tions.
4.2.1 Statistically Significant Randomized Trials
A statistically significant number of attacks was performed with randomized evasions
and evasion combinations against each IPS device under test. To achieve magnitude
large enough, every experiment in this study contained a million attacks. The used
exploit stayed the same during a single experiment, and only the evasions changed.
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Obviously, the same set of evasions were run against each IPS device under test to
get comparable results.
To get a broad knowledge of the effectiveness of various evasion techniques, two
different exploits were used. Both of the exploits utilized different protocols. That
is why it was possible to test more evasion techniques because each protocol has
its own unique characteristics that protocol-specific evasions try to exploit. Thus,
evasions were tested at as many OSI layers as possible within the limits of the testing
tool.
35 different atomic evasions were utilized in this study. 15 of them can be used
with both of the attacks. Besides those 15 evasions, 9 different evasions were only
utilized in the attacks against Ubuntu and 11 in the attacks against Windows XP.
The evasion techniques, which were used in this study, are listed in Appendix A
with brief descriptions.
Reruns
Running of an attack can fail. In this context, an attack process is considered
successful if the attack is terminated by an IPS, or it passes through the detection.
The attack is considered failed if it was not able to run so that the IPS can decide
whether to pass or block it. This can happen due to various reasons, for instance,
when establishing of a TCP connection does not succeed because of a network error,
or the target system is under a heavy load and not able to process all the requests.
So, if running an attack failed instantly, the attack was tried to rerun later.
Obfuscation
Intrusion prevention systems cannot rely on catching an attack by using signature-
based detection to just match the used shellcode encoder. Of course, the signature-
based detection of shellcode encoders is a useful way to try to detect attacks, but it
should not be the only method used. IPS devices should not need to know what is
in the payload since they should be able to detect attacks based on the vulnerability
which is being exploited.
From now on, throughout this thesis, obfuscation refers to the process of creating
a randomized shellcode encoder for every attack. It is studied if the obfuscation of
payloads affects the ability of IPS devices to detect attacks. That is why every
experiment was performed with and without obfuscation.
4.2.2 Standardized IPS Configurations
Standardized configurations were needed since the goal is to perform objective exper-
iments and examine the IPS devices in a reliable manner. Reliable results cannot
be produced if the devices are configured to handle threats differently. This can
only be achieved if the devices are configured to operate as similar to each other as
possible. Of course, all the devices will always have their distinctive software and
hardware properties and features, but with a proper, standardized configuration,
the implications caused by the differences of the devices can be decreased.
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There are lots of challenges for setting up a correct and the most accurate con-
figuration and detection policy for each IPS device. For instance, different intrusion
prevention systems do not behave similarly. They have their own unique way of
interpreting the incoming network traffic and determining whether it contains some
threats or not. Even the level of a threat’s severity is not always considered the same
in every IPS device. Additionally, all the same functionalities and services have not
been implemented into every device.
Obviously, none of the device configuration interfaces are identical to each other,
so it is not possible to have exactly the same configurations in every device. The
lack of a common language between the different devices itself is not a problem, but
it is worth noticing that the naming and implementation of certain functionalities
may differ much between the devices which also means that it takes time to get
familiar with the devices.
A major thing is that the devices usually need some modifications and adjust-
ments to the default configuration and detection policy to match the requirements
that are given from the environment the device is being used. Often an IPS de-
vice may contain a few default detection policies, which highlight some aspects that
may be relevant to the end user. A good example of this behaviour is a policy
that emphasizes connectivity over security since the customers may actually want
to prioritize the accessibility of applications and other resources. Vendors usually
have a detection policy in their products that aims to provide the highest level of
security. However, selecting the most secure configuration template and detection
policy, which are available by default, does not guarantee that it is actually effective
enough in practice.
Due to these restrictions, it is important to standardize all the configurations
and detection policies. If the standardisation is not performed properly, the results
will not be comparable. That would invalidate the study. It means that the results
would be biased since some of the device configurations and detection policies might
be better than the others. In that case, those devices would also perform better in
the experiments than the other devices even though the other devices might actually
be capable to perform at the same level or even better.
Establishing a baseline, for the device configurations and detection policies, was
needed to be able to evaluate if the state of the art intrusion prevention systems
are vulnerable to different evasion techniques and combinations. The devices were
configured to be as strict as possible, but still they were able to pass normal network
traffic. Every device was configured to follow the guidelines presented in the next
paragraph. In most cases, this was achieved by hardening the default configurations.
An IPS device has to:
• permit clean network traffic because an IPS device that terminates everything
is useless.
• block the exploits that are used against it. In this study, two different exploits
were in use.
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• permit sending clean traffic using the same protocol as the exploit. It is not
wanted that devices are configured to block an entire protocol in order to catch
the exploit. As previously mentioned, all the configurations and detection
policies were as strict as possible, but the configurations had to be usable and
realistic, too.
• block the same exploits when different evasions and evasion combinations were
used.
Since the devices were configured to perform in the experiments as well as possi-
ble and in the same way with each other within the limits of the capabilities of the
devices, it is possible to get comparable results. It also makes possible to reliably
evaluate the vulnerabilities of the devices to evasion techniques.
Still, of course, there is always a possibility of a misconfiguration or misbehaviour
by the device even though the configurations were tried to make as good as possible.
To minimize the risk of a configuration error, it was verified before each experiment
that the device under test was functioning properly and not in any kind of error
state. It was also verified that the device operated in the way that was specified in
the configuration guidelines earlier.
4.3 Implementation
The following sections discuss the implementation of the experiments. They list the
modifications needed to the software used throughout this study and explain how
the environment was tested before running the experiments. The process of running
the experiments is also covered.
4.3.1 Software Modifications
A small modification to software was needed in order to be able to perform all
the experiments in this study. The output of Mongbat can be modified to show
somewhat more information including the used Evader commands. Additionally,
Mongbat always uses obfuscation by default, but with a few lines of modification to
the source code, a new flag can be added to indicate whether to obfuscate or not.
The modified version of software is available online3.
4.3.2 Operating Systems
The attacker computer ran Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, Evader and the modified version
of Mongbat. All the experiments were run against two different target operating
systems, Ubuntu 12.04 LTS and Windows XP Service Pack 2.
Running a million attacks takes some time, but the process is considerably faster
if the attacks are run simultaneously using multiple instances of Evader tool. In
3http://isrg.blogs.glam.ac.uk/2012/09/05/stonesofts-evader-0-9-8-557-
modifications-for-testing-aets
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Mongbat, 40 separate instances, called workers, were used throughout this study to
speed up the process.
Setting a high number of workers is not enough because the target operation
systems tend to reject some of the new incoming connections. It happens because
the operation systems are not configured by default to handle such a high number
of new connections in a short period of time. That is why some modifications to the
target operating systems needed to be done. The following paragraphs list all the
needed modifications to the target operation systems.
Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
The type of the Ubuntu installation was a 32-bit server. It can be downloaded, for
example, from the official Ubuntu web page. In this study, a modified version of
Ubuntu was used as a target system. It contained Evader, some vulnerable services
and scripts to control those services. It is available online as an OVF template4.
The /etc/sysctl.conf file, which has been dedicated to setting system variables,
was modified to ensure connectivity to the target computer. Two changes were
needed. The first step was to increase threshold values to avoid neighbour table
overflow warnings. Thus, the ARP table of the server does not fill up immediately.
The second step was to reduce the keepalive time and interval and the number
of TCP keepalive messages to ensure the establishment of TCP connections. It
is possible that the establishment of TCP connections to the target computer will
constantly fail when running Mongbat with 40 workers. It happens because the
server tries to maintain all the connections for a certain period of time. That is why
it does not free resources right after each attack attempt, and eventually the server
runs out of resources. These modifications were done in the following way:
net.ipv4.neigh.default.gc_thresh1 = 4096
net.ipv4.neigh.default.gc_thresh2 = 8192
net.ipv4.neigh.default.gc_thresh3 = 65536
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 2
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes = 1
Windows XP Service Pack 2
The unpatched version of Windows XP SP2 was used because it is vulnerable to Con-
ficker. Some minor changes [8] were needed in the Windows registry to reduce the
number of Event ID 2022 errors, which happen when there are not enough free net-
work connections available for users. This can be achieved by using Registry Editor
and going to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanman
server\parameters registry subkey and then adding two different values of data
type REG_DWORD:
4http://evader.stonesoft.com/evader/download
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Value Name: MaxFreeConnections
Value data: 4096 (decimal)
Value Name: MinFreeConnections
Value data: 256 (decimal)
4.3.3 Experiments
Four independent experiments with Mongbat were run against every DUT, two
against Windows XP SP2 and two against Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. Both of the experi-
ments against the same operation system were similar to each other except obfus-
cation was disabled in one test and enabled in the other. The Conficker exploit was
used against Windows and the HTTP phpBB Highlight exploit was used against
Ubuntu.
Initial Testing
Even though the configuration of the DUT was initially checked to be correct, the
status of the DUT was rechecked before running every Mongbat test. This was
achieved by performing a few tests. It was verified that the DUT was able to pass
clean traffic by sending a non-malicious payload to the target host. If the target host
replied, there was connectivity between the attacker and the target. The following
command was run with Evader:
./evader --attack=conficker --if=eth0 --src_ip=10.1.0.10
--dst_ip=10.1.0.1 --verifydelay=1000 --clean
It was also needed to check that the DUT was able to block an actual attack.
Basically, the same command was used as previously, but the flag "–clean" was
excluded from the command. Since the used exploits are relatively old and well-
known every DUT should be able to block them.
Additionally, it was needed to verify that the DUT was able to block an attack
that uses obfuscation. Once again Evader was used:
./evader --attack=conficker --if=eth0 --src_ip=10.1.0.10
--dst_ip=10.1.0.1 --verifydelay=1000 --obfuscate
Of course, these tests were also performed when testing the environment using
the HTTP phpBB Highlight exploit. Then naturally the attack flag was set to
"http_phpbb_highlight".
4.3.4 Long Test Runs with Mongbat
It was noticed that after running the Conficker exploit successfully against Windows
XP SP2 over two thousand times but less than three thousand times, the operation
system goes into a state where it cannot receive any network connection. To avoid
this from happening, a script was created to restore the virtualized Windows XP
to its initial state every minute. When the virtual machine was being restored, the
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attacker cannot establish a TCP connection to the target and test evasion combi-
nations’ ability to fool the DUT. That is why rechecking of those failed attacks was
needed after the test was finished. The Mongbat test run against Windows was
performed by using the following command:
ruby mongbat.rb --mode=random --attack=conficker --iface=eth0
--victim=10.1.0.1 --validator=externals/conficker_validator.rb
--attacker=10.1.0.10 --ips_per_worker=1 --workers=40 --mask=16
--time=216000 --check_victim=false --randseed=1qaz2wsx3edc
--disable_obfuscate
Against Ubuntu, quite similar settings were used:
ruby mongbat.rb --mode=random --attack=http_phpbb_highlight
--iface=eth0 --victim=10.10.0.1
--validator=externals/http_phpbb_highlight_validator.rb
--attacker=10.10.0.10 --ips_per_worker=1000 --workers=40 --mask=16
--time=216000 --check_victim=false --randseed=1qaz2wsx3edc
--disable_obfuscate
Mongbat runs the same set of evasions in attacks if the seed value stays the
same. When multiple workers are in use, Mongbat runs multiple Evader instances
in parallel. If exactly the same Mongbat command is run twice, the log files produced
by the modified version of Mongbat do not contain the attacks in the same order.
Mongbat is always run for a certain amount of time. After finishing the runs, the
first X attacks are probably not exactly the same because the workers might not
execute the attacks in the same time in each run.
To avoid the need for processing the logs to get the results from attacks with the
same set of evasions, a script was created that contains a list of exactly a million
attacks with evasions and evasion combinations based on the initial Mongbat run.
Basically, the list contains the used Evader commands. The script directly executes
all of the million attacks using multiple simultaneously run Evader instances.
After running the million attacks, the script matches all the failed attacks from
the log file and tries to rerun those attacks. Rerun is performed up to 20 times
to make sure that all the attacks are executed properly. A failed attack means,
for example, an attack that was not able to establish a TCP connection. These
situations are logged by Evader with a message "300: TCP connection failed". The
number of failed connections was usually significant in Windows XP because of the
virtual machine restoring process. In Ubuntu, restoring was not needed, so the
connection failure rate was also lower.
The script is considered hostile. It executes the million attacks and possibly tries
to rerun some of them multiple times. That is why its source code is not included in
this thesis. To run the same million attacks when obfuscating is enabled, the script
only includes the flag "–obfuscate" in Evader commands.
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4.4 Summary
The testing environment consisted of the attacker computer, the intrusion preven-
tion system under test and the target computer, which ran vulnerable software.
The tool that was used for attacking was Stonesoft Evader. Ten commercial in-
trusion prevention systems and one open source solution were tested in this study.
Both Windows and Linux operating systems were used as target hosts in different
experiments.
Each experiment in this study contained a million attacks in order to achieve
magnitude large enough. All the attacks were performed with randomized evasions
and evasion combinations against each intrusion prevention system. The used exploit
stayed the same during a single experiment, and only the evasions changed.
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5 Experiments and Analysis
Four experiments were conducted to test the vulnerability of intrusion prevention
systems against evasion techniques. In each of the experiments, a million attacks
were run against target operations systems. Two of the experiments were run against
Windows and two against Ubuntu. The tested intrusion prevention systems were
placed between the attacker and the target operation systems to block the attacks.
Every attack was masked with different evasion techniques or evasion combinations.
This chapter lists all the results from these experiments. Additionally, a thorough
analysis is done about these results. The reliability of the results is also discussed.
There was limited time available to test the commercial IPS devices. Since Aalto
University does not own the tested IPS devices, the experiments were dependent on
the schedule of the third party, which provided the IPS devices. Due to these time
limitations, few experiments were excluded from the final results.
With the McAfee IPS device, only 1 out of 4 experiments was successful. During
the other experiments, which turned out to be unsuccessful, the device went to an
error state after performing as expected for a certain period of time. During this
erroneous state, the device terminated all the incoming connections. It happened
when establishing TCP connections, so the terminations were not caused by detect-
ing the actual attack. Due to the incomplete results, it was needed to exclude those
experiments from this thesis.
The devices were tested during the summer of 2013. Because the process of
having the commercial IPS devices tested was dependent on the schedule of the
third party, it was not possible to test all the devices at once. When an IPS device
was acquired for testing, software was always updated to the latest version available
at that moment. However, there was an open source system, Snort, included in the
experiments. The hardware used for Snort was provided by Aalto University. Since
the hardware was available through the whole testing period, it was decided that
it was tested last so that it was possible to use the latest software. There was no
reason to use older software, since the other devices were not tested at the same
time but during a few weeks.
It is argued that none of the tested IPS devices gained unfair benefit for the
experiments because of the time they were tested. All the used exploits were old,
from the year 2004 and 2008, and the used evasion techniques were not particularly
new, since some of them were discovered in 1998 and the majority in the 2000s.
So, the devices should have been able to block the attacks even though some of the
devices were tested a few weeks earlier than the others.
5.1 Evasion Detection Rates
As explained in Section 4.2, a statistically significant number of attacks, namely a
million, was performed with randomized evasions and evasion combinations against
each IPS device under test. The used exploit stayed the same during a single ex-
periment. These principles applied to all the experiments that were run against the
target operation systems, Windows XP SP2 and Ubuntu 12.04.
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The experiments were run with and without obfuscation. The set of evasions
stayed the same in the experiments that were run against the same operation sys-
tem. This means that the experiments targeting, for example, Windows XP utilized
exactly the same evasions and evasion combinations with identical parameters when
obfuscation was disabled or enabled. Thus, the same set of evasions were run against
each IPS device under test.
The second and the third column of Table 2 list the results of Experiment A. In
this experiment, a million attacks with various evasions and evasion combinations
were run against each IPS device under test. The target host behind the intru-
sion prevention systems was running Windows XP SP2. The attacks exploited the
vulnerability known as CVE-2008-4250. The obfuscation option provided by the
Evader tool was disabled in this experiment.
Table 2: Evasive attacks with and without obfuscation against Windows
Experiment A Experiment B
Obfuscation disabled Obfuscation enabled
IPS Successful
evasions
Detection rate Successful
evasions
Detection rate
Check Point 40748 95.92% 40917 95.91%
Cisco 4397 99.56% 4499 99.55%
Fortigate 20705 97.93% 20949 97.91%
IBM 10970 98.90% 11665 98.83%
Juniper 84579 91.54% 86093 91.39%
Palo Alto 31155 96.88% 31373 96.86%
Snort 19485 98.05% 36983 96.30%
SourceFire 11726 98.83% 17543 98.25%
Stonesoft 0 100.00% 0 100.00%
Tipping Point 2891 99.71% 34582 96.54%
As shown in the results of Experiment A, almost all the tested IPS devices (9
out of 10) passed through some attacks. Detection rates between the devices varied
from 91.54% to 100%. Six of the devices were capable of having over 98% detection
rate.
The fourth and the fifth column of Table 2 list the results of Experiment B,
which was similar to the previously presented Experiment A except the obfuscation
option was enabled in the Evader tool. Again, almost all the tested IPS devices
(9 out of 10) passed through some attacks as seen from the results of Experiment
B. The overall detection rate stayed near the same. Four devices were capable of
having over 98% detection rate in Experiment B.
Theoretically, the use of obfuscation makes it more difficult for intrusion pre-
vention systems to detect the attacks because IPS devices cannot rely on detecting
the used shellcode encoder. When comparing the results of Experiment B with Ex-
periment A, where obfuscation was disabled, it can be noticed that the enabling of
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obfuscation had a very small effect on the majority of the tested devices. There
was an exception though. When comparing the results of Tipping Point with and
without obfuscation, it can be seen that obfuscation affected the results quite sig-
nificantly. The number of successful attacks with obfuscation was ten times larger
than without obfuscation. It means that the detection rate dropped from 99.71%
to 96.54% with that particular device when obfuscation was enabled.
The second and the third column of Table 3 list the results of Experiment C.
Once again a million attacks with various evasions and evasion combinations were
run against each IPS device. The target host behind the intrusion prevention systems
ran this time Ubuntu 12.04. The attacks exploited the vulnerability known as CVE-
2004-1315. Obfuscation was disabled in this experiment.
Table 3: Evasive attacks with and without obfuscation against Ubuntu
Experiment C Experiment D
Obfuscation disabled Obfuscation enabled
IPS Successful
evasions
Detection rate Successful
evasions
Detection rate
Check Point 34350 96.56% 34688 96.53%
Cisco 63546 93.65% 189550 81.05%
Fortigate 1180 99.88% 1969 99.80%
IBM 37252 96.28% 257138 74.29%
Juniper 64648 93.54% 94595 90.54%
McAfee 5202 99.48% - -
Palo Alto 31464 96.85% 456109 55.39%
Snort 10623 98.94% 11985 98.8%
SourceFire 38557 96.14% 65835 93.42%
Stonesoft 0 100.00% 0 100.00%
Tipping Point 73650 92.64% 75380 92.46%
Almost all the tested IPS devices (10 out of 11) passed through some attacks.
Detection rates between the devices varied from 92.64% to 100%. In Experiment C,
four of the devices were capable of detecting over 98% of the attacks.
When comparing the results of Experiment C with Experiment A, it can be seen
that in overall the detection rates were somewhat lower in half the cases. There are
many different aspects that need to be noticed when comparing experiments A and
C. They used entirely different exploits, and the used evasion techniques were not
entirely the same.
The fourth and the fifth column of Table 3 list the results of Experiment D,
which was similar to Experiment C except obfuscation was enabled. As seen from
the results of Experiment D, almost all the tested IPS devices (9 out of 10) passed
through some attacks. The variation of the results was relatively large. Detection
rates between the devices varied from 55.39% to 100%. It was considerably larger
variation when comparing with Experiment C. Some of the detection rates dropped
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significantly. Three of the devices were capable of having over 98% detection rate.
When comparing the results of experiments C and D, it is shown that the en-
abling of obfuscation affected many of the tested devices. For example, when com-
paring the results of Palo Alto with and without obfuscation, it can be seen that
obfuscation had a huge impact on the results. The detection rate dropped from
99.81% to 55.39% when obfuscation was enabled.
Obfuscation
All the further analysis is conducted from the experiments that include obfuscation.
As seen in Tables 2 and 3, obfuscation increases the possibility that an attack is
capable of evading the detection of intrusion prevention systems. With obfuscation,
the detection rates are equal or lower than the detection rates of the experiments
without obfuscation. The result was expected because obfuscation can be considered
as an additional mean to try to fool intrusion prevention systems.
By using a new, customized shellcode encoder in every attack, which means
enabling obfuscation, intrusion prevention systems are not able to solely rely on
detecting the shellcode encoders. As mentioned earlier, the test tool uses well-
known shellcode encoders from Metasploit when obfuscation is disabled. That makes
it possible that an IPS device just recognizes the shellcode encoder but does not
actually detect the attack, which is masked with evasions.
Since this thesis studies how well different intrusion prevention systems can de-
tect attacks, which are masqueraded with evasions, the analysis concentrates on
experiments including obfuscation. The experiments indicate that obfuscation in-
creases the possibility that an attack can go through an IPS device undetected.
5.2 Atomic Evasions
This study concentrates on evasion combinations, but it also considers the possibil-
ity that only one evasion technology can be enough to evade intrusion prevention
systems. A single evasion technique is called an atomic evasion. There were 35
atomic evasions used in this study. 26 atomic evasions out of 35 can be utilized
when attacking Windows. In the same way, 24 evasions were eligible against Linux.
Evasions that utilize IP and TCP protocols are naturally eligible against both of the
target systems. Thus, this study included 15 atomic evasions, which were utilized
in each of the experiments.
The used tool and the exploits provided with it restrict the use of atomic evasions
in a certain way. In this study, evasions utilizing HTTP were run against Linux.
However, these evasions are not restricted to Linux but to the protocol. If an exploit
against Windows used HTTP, the HTTP evasions would be eligible against Windows
too.
Due to the nature of this thesis, the exact successful atomic evasions against each
device under test (DUT) are not disclosed. The same policy is used throughout this
study, so successful evasion combinations are not disclosed either. The reason is
that this study only states the effectiveness of various evasion techniques, but its
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intention is not to become a reference guide in attacking some particular intrusion
prevention system.
Every evasion has a dedicated set of parameters available that can only be ap-
plied to that particular evasion. Each of the parameters may have numerous values
that can be assigned to the parameter. The evasion technique utilizing TCP seg-
mentation, for example, has only one possible parameter, which is the segment size,
but it allows integer values from 1 to 65535. It should be also noticed that other
evasion techniques may be associated with more than one parameter.
It is possible to try to fine-tune atomic evasions to be successful. It is done by
using different parameter combinations and by assigning different values to those
parameters. Due to the high number of different parameters and parameter values,
there are numerous ways of fine-tuning the atomic evasions.
Table 4 lists the number of successful atomic evasions against each intrusion
prevention system. It contains evasion techniques that were used against Windows
and Ubuntu operation systems. Table 4 clearly shows that just one evasion technique
can still be enough to masquerade an attack. So, even though the atomic evasions,
which were used in this study, are well-known and some of them from the 1990s [61],
they were able to fool some of the tested intrusion prevention systems.
Table 4: The number of successful atomic evasions, which can be fine-tuned to be
effective, when attacking against Windows and Ubuntu
IPS Windows (out of 26) Ubuntu (out of 24)
Check Point 4 1
Cisco 24 23
Fortigate 24 10
IBM 20 23
Juniper 22 23
Palo Alto 22 23
Snort 24 23
SourceFire 21 23
Stonesoft 0 0
Tipping Point 23 9
The variation of the results was large. There were devices that handled quite
well various atomic evasions. On the other hand, there were many IPS devices
struggling with atomic evasions. Some of the available atomic evasion techniques
were not effective, so they were not capable of evading intrusion prevention systems
if other evasion techniques were not included in the attack.
It can be seen from the results that only one evasion technique was enough in
many cases. This applied to both of the target systems. It must also be taken
into account that a single atomic evasion was considered successful if an attack was
carried to the target system successfully at least once. Even though each of the
atomic evasions can be assigned a huge number of different parameter values, it is
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possible that a successful combination of parameter values was found in this study
only once.
The percentage of each of the successful atomic evasions against both of the tar-
get machines was generally quite low. There were cases with less than ten successful
attacks and, like stated in the previous paragraph, sometimes it was found only one
set of successful parameter values. However, larger percentages also existed.
Usually there was almost the same number of successful atomic evasions against
Windows and Ubuntu when comparing the results between the DUT. However, Tip-
ping Point seemed to be one of the exceptions. There were lots of successful evasions,
namely 23, against Windows, but the number of successful evasions against Ubuntu
was only 9. Fortigate had also quite similar results. These results can be explained
easily. Both of the devices handled atomic evasions against HTTP protocol quite
well, but the common evasion techniques, utilizing IP and TCP protocols, against
Windows and Ubuntu target machines caused problems. Additionally, the atomic
evasions with SMB, MSRPC, NetBIOS protocols sometimes caused problems, which
explain the relatively high number of successful atomic evasions against Windows
target machine.
Old atomic evasion techniques were still effective against the state of the art
instruction prevention systems. Like previously stated, the first academic papers
about evasions were published in the 1990s [61]. Over a decade after the discovery
of these evasion techniques, they were able to fool the majority of the tested intrusion
prevention systems.
These results regarding atomic evasions verify that a single atomic evasion can be
enough to avoid detection. Dyrmose also showed in his study in 2013 that certain
intrusion prevention systems are vulnerable when these techniques are used even
though the scope of the study was significantly smaller. It only used a few evasion
techniques with specific parameter values. [36]
The ineffectiveness of evasion techniques against each DUT was also studied.
In Table 4, the number of successful atomic evasions is listed, so it can easily be
determined that the other remaining evasions were not enough for masquerading
attacks. If, for example, 5 atomic evasions are successful, the rest are ineffective.
However, some of the remaining evasion techniques can be successful if they are
combined with other evasions. That is why an atomic evasion was determined
successful if it was capable of evading the detection when combining it with some
other evasion techniques.
To be able to have a list that contains only evasion techniques that are not
successful against a DUT, it is needed to further analyse evasion combinations.
First, it is checked that there is not a successful attack available when using an
atomic evasion or a combination utilizing that particular evasion. Then, the atomic
evasion is ineffective.
It is also possible that an atomic evasion is used in an evasion combination, but
it is not actually needed for evading. In that case, first it is verified that the atomic
evasion is ineffective, when only that particular evasion is used in attacks. Then it
is checked if the atomic evasion can be removed from the evasion combination. In
other words, if there is an attack, which is masked with evasions A, B and C, it
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might be possible that only evasions A and B are necessary for evading and evasion
C does not have any effect.
Table 5 lists the number of ineffective evasion techniques. As previously stated,
the results take into account that some of the evasion combinations do not actually
need to utilize all of their atomic evasions to be effective.
Table 5: The number of ineffective atomic evasions when attacking against Windows
and Ubuntu
IPS Windows (out of 26) Ubuntu (out of 24)
Check Point 22 21
Cisco 2 1
Fortigate 2 13
IBM 6 1
Juniper 4 1
Palo Alto 4 1
Snort 2 1
SourceFire 5 1
Stonesoft 26 24
Tipping Point 3 15
There were evasion techniques available that seem to be ineffective against the
majority of the tested IPS devices. However, the distribution of the used evasions
was not the same. It means that some of the evasion techniques were used more
often when comparing with the others. Generally, each of the evasion techniques
was used thousands of times, but there was an exception. There was an evasion
technique that was used in attacks against Windows machines, and it was utilized
only about ten times in the attacks. This happened because Mongbat was used to
create and launch a million attacks against the targeted machines. With the selected
seed value, the tool itself did not frequently use that particular evasion. That was
noticed after the testing of IPS devices had begun, so the test set of evasions stayed
the same because it was not possible to run more attacks against each DUT at that
point. Since that particular evasion was only used in few attacks, it is not possible
to draw a conclusion of its effectiveness.
There were ineffective evasion techniques that were used in the attacks against
Windows and Linux target machines. They seem to be ineffective against all the
tested intrusion prevention systems. Additionally, there were evasion techniques
that did not work against the majority of the devices but were still able to evade
some of the IPS devices.
5.3 Evasion Combinations
As previously stated, it is possible to masquerade an attack by only using one
evasion technique so that it is capable of reaching its target. However, one evasion
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technique is not always enough. Then the solution might be to combine multiple
evasion techniques. Even a single atomic evasion technique can be used multiple
times in the attack with different parameter values.
In this study, the average number of evasions used in successful attacks was below
2. The result shows that a relatively small number of different evasion techniques
was needed to combine in order to avoid detection by intrusion prevention systems.
To be able to further analyse the results given in Section 5.1, the number of
different evasion combinations is calculated. It means, for example, that if an attack
is masked with evasion techniques X, Y and Z and it is not blocked by the DUT,
these three evasion techniques form a successful evasion combination. Only the used
evasion techniques are considered a significant factor, so all the possible evasion
parameters are ignored in this study. Like stated previously, each evasion technique
can have multiple parameters. These evasion-specific parameters can be assigned
different values, and the set of possible values can be large.
If an attack is, for example, masked with an evasion technique X and the pre-
viously mentioned evasion technique, TCP segmentation, with a parameter value A
and able to reach its destination, the two used evasion techniques are considered a
successful evasion combination. That is why the number of evasion combinations is
increased by one. If the attack is also successful with the same set of evasions but
with different parameters, it is not considered a new, successful evasion combination
any more. Thus, it does not increase the calculated number of evasion combinations.
Table 6 lists how many different evasion combinations were found that were
capable of evading the detection. The number of successful evasion combinations
is listed against Windows and Ubuntu. When the parameters and their values are
ignored, there were 8278 possible combinations in this study that can be utilized
against Windows and 11383 against Ubuntu. The results clearly indicate that some
of these evasion combinations were effective.
Table 6: The number of evasion combinations, which can be fine-tuned to be effec-
tive, when attacking against Windows and Ubuntu
IPS Windows Ubuntu
Check Point 1496 1133
Cisco 519 4133
Fortigate 1445 412
IBM 913 5202
Juniper 2915 3639
Palo Alto 1338 5781
Snort 1950 1263
SourceFire 940 2804
Stonesoft 0 0
Tipping Point 1742 2934
Maximum 8278 11383
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As the results indicated in Tables 2 and 3, there were more successful evasion
combinations against Ubuntu than Windows. This is the expected result, as shown
in Table 6, because the detection rates were worse in the attacks against Linux.
There were three IPS devices that had less successful evasion combinations
against Linux than Windows. These results are also consistent with the results
presented in Tables 2 and 3. The other intrusion preventions systems performed
better in the attacks against Windows excluding the Stonesoft IPS, which performed
equally well in both attacks.
Combining multiple evasion techniques increased the possibility to find a way to
evade detection. As seen in Table 4, Checkpoint had only one atomic evasion that
was capable of evading the detection when attacking Ubuntu. However, Table 6
lists that there are hundreds of successful evasion combinations that can be used in
attacks. Even if the atomic evasion that was able to evade the detection itself, with
certain parameter values, was excluded from the results, there were still successful
evasion combinations available.
Additionally, it is worth noticing that even if a single evasion technique is suc-
cessful with certain parameter values, it might be easier to find multiple successful
evasion combinations than just use one single evasion technique. As previously
stated, some of the atomic evasion techniques are able to fool intrusion prevention
systems without the need for adding additional evasion techniques. Nevertheless,
the finding of suitable values for the evasion parameters can be tricky. There were
examples in this study that a single evasion technique was able to fool IPS devices
only once. It means that all the other used values for the parameters were not
effective.
The results of Experiments B and D are summarized in Tables 7 and 8. The
tables list the number of successful attacks against Windows and Ubuntu. The
columns list how often that particular evasion was used successfully in all of the
attacks. However, the actual evasion technique is not disclosed. The last column
lists the number of successful attacks against that particular DUT. Since each attack
can contain a various number of different evasion techniques, the sum of the values
in evasion columns is not equal to the total number of successful attacks. Some
of the values are bold. That particular evasion technique had at least one set of
parameter values available that was able to evade the detection without the help of
other evasion techniques. So, if a single successful atomic evasion was detected, the
value is bold.
An evasion technique was counted only once per an attack even if it was used
twice or more in the attack. This means that the number of successful evasion usage
increased only the same amount in each attack. In other words, using an evasion
technique multiple times with different parameter values in an attack was counted
as a single usage.
The tables disclose the volume of the successful attacks utilizing certain evasion
techniques. Even though the distribution of the evasion techniques was varying, it
still gives an indication how effective a certain evasion technique is when the result
is compared with the other intrusion prevention systems. In the same manner the
effectiveness of single atomic evasions can be compared between different intrusion
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prevention systems by examining the bold values. However, the bold values only
reveal that those evasion techniques can be fine-tuned to be successful without com-
bining them with other evasions. It does not list how many successful attacks were
found, utilizing only one evasion technique.
When studying closer the results of Table 7, it is seen that some of the evasion
techniques were more effective against a group of tested intrusion prevention systems.
SourceFire was fourth in the results, but it had problems with the evasion technique
Z, which clearly weakened its results. Over 95% of the successful attacks utilized
that particular evasion technique. Also Juniper and Snort had problems detecting
the attacks that utilized the evasion technique Z. They allowed a higher number
of attacks using that particular evasion technique than SourceFire. However, the
percentage of successful attacks utilizing the evasion technique Z was not as high as
it was with SourceFire where almost all the successful attacks utilized it.
The results show that there were various evasion techniques that were signifi-
cantly more effective against one particular intrusion prevention system. For ex-
ample, the evasion technique C was over 25 times more effective against Juniper
than the other tested intrusion prevention systems. However, these results can be
explained with the fact that Juniper passed the highest number of attacks, so it is
possible that the evasion technique C was successfully combined with some other
evasion techniques. The number of successful attacks utilizing the evasion tech-
niques E, J and K were significantly higher against Check Point. Even though these
results show that Check Point had problems with certain evasion techniques, the
results with the other evasion techniques do not stand out. In fact, Check Point was
one of the few tested intrusion prevention systems that were capable of stopping
the majority of the attacks that were fine-tuned with atomic evasion techniques. As
Juniper passed the highest number of attacks, it is not surprising to see that several
evasion techniques, including G, H, I, L and T, were the most successful techniques
in the attacks against Juniper.
There are many examples in the results showing that at least about half of the
successful attacks utilized the same evasion technique. For example, this happened
with SourceFire and Juniper when utilizing the previously mentioned evasion tech-
nique Z. Similar behaviour was found with Tipping Point and Palo Alto when they
utilized the evasion techniques M and U, respectively.
As previously mentioned, Table 8 shows the results of the attacks against Ubuntu.
Palo Alto passed the highest number of attacks, so the evasion columns of Palo Alto
stand out. When comparing the results of a single evasion technique between the
tested intrusion prevention systems, Palo Alto has the highest number of attacks
19 times out of 24. However, various evasion techniques also caused problems with
the other intrusion prevention systems. For example, the evasion technique C was
effective against Checkpoint since almost all the successful attacks utilized that par-
ticular evasion technique. Checkpoint also had the highest number of successful
attacks utilizing that evasion technique among the tested intrusion prevention sys-
tems. Fortigate performed second best in overall, but the evasion technique V caused
most of the problems since almost 55% of the successful attacks utilized that par-
ticular evasion technique. Snort was third in the results, but it also had difficulties
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with one evasion technique, namely D.
Tables 9 and 10 represent how well different evasions function as evasion com-
binations. The results count only the evasions that were combined with at least
one other evasion technique. That is why the single atomic evasions were excluded.
There are separate tables available for the results of the attacks against Windows
and Ubuntu.
The columns list the success rates of evasions in percentages. Each success rate
was calculated in proportion to the total number of the attempts to utilize that
particular evasion in evasion combinations. So, unlike previously, the results in
columns do not represent the successful evasion usage in all of the attacks including
the whole set of a million attacks. The relative results can be compared with each
other since the results take into consideration how often each evasion was tried to
utilize in the attacks.
These tables give a strong indication of the evasion techniques that are the most
probable techniques that can be successfully utilized to evade any of the tested
intrusion prevention systems. There were clearly evasion techniques that were more
successful than the others. Utilizing those evasion techniques by combining them
with each other produces the most dangerous attacks. The results can also be
interpreted in the other way around to see the most ineffective evasion techniques.
The results of Table 9 give an indication of the evasion techniques that can be
successfully combined with other evasions. For example, the evasion technique H
was successfully combined with some other evasions with the success rate over 49%
against Juniper. As seen in Table 7, the highest number of successful attacks against
Check Point utilized the evasion techniques E, J, K and W. When these techniques
were combined with some other evasions, their effectiveness varied. For example,
the evasion technique E was combined with other evasions with the success rate over
42%. However, the evasion technique W had only the success rate of 10%, which
is a significantly weaker result. Thus, it can be seen that the evasion technique W
is not the best choice when selecting the evasion combinations for attacks against
Check Point.
The results of certain evasion techniques between different intrusion prevention
systems may vary quite significantly. Some evasion techniques can cause more prob-
lems to a certain intrusion prevention system than to the others even if that IPS
device actually performed better in overall. Thus, the weaknesses of different in-
trusion prevention systems were revealed against certain techniques. The results
of Table 10 show that the evasion technique D was combined with other evasions
with the success rate over 69% against Tipping Point and over 50% against Juniper.
These results clearly show that this evasion technique can be successfully combined
with other evasions when attacking many of the tested intrusion prevention systems.
Additionally, the results of the evasion technique C stand out. As seen in Table 8,
almost all the successful attacks against Check Point utilized the evasion technique
C. The results of Table 10 show that even though that particular evasion technique
was effective in the attacks against Check Point, it was not effective each time it
was utilized since its success rate was over 61%.
Evasions are a real threat. The results show that evasion techniques can be
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used successfully to evade the detection of intrusion prevention systems. Even a
single evasion technique can be enough to fool an intrusion prevention systems if it
is equipped with suitable parameter values.
There are numerous of evasion combinations available, and it seems that intrusion
prevention systems are beatable. Since there are lots of different evasions available,
it is possible to find a successful evasion combination for an attack. The risk of
a successful attack increases if an attacker has the possibility to test an intrusion
prevention system and find a successful evasion combination before launching an
actual attack.
Many of the tested intrusion prevention systems seem to have problems under-
standing the traffic that pass through them correctly. That is why it is difficult
to detect all the attacks that are masked with evasions. That leads to a situation
where various evasion techniques are effective against intrusion prevention systems.
As described in Section 3.4, there are countermeasures against evasions, such
as traffic normalization and reassembly. The results of this study indicate that
normalization and reassembly have not been properly implemented in some of the
tested intrusion prevention systems. This can be stated because the number of
successful attacks utilizing evasion techniques was so high. Reassembling TCP/IP
traffic consumes resources significantly, and there is a need for intrusion prevention
systems to perform at high speeds [79]. That is why the significance of reassembly
may have been overlooked in the implementations of various intrusion prevention
systems to ensure the highest performance.
Some of the tested intrusion prevention systems seem to have difficulties in cor-
rectly understanding all the semantics of various protocols. There were multiple
examples in the results that show that an intrusion prevention system was able to
detect attacks that were masked with evasions better when the attacks utilized cer-
tain protocols. This shows that understanding about different protocols can vary
significantly in a single IPS device.
This study indicates that a free intrusion prevention system, Snort, performs as
well as the majority of commercial solutions. There were not any results from the
experiments that would imply otherwise. Snort was not last in any of the results,
and its detection rate in the attacks against Ubuntu was third best.
The intrusion prevention system from Stonesoft was the only device that did
not pass attacks which were masked with evasions in any of the experiments. It is
fair to assume that Stonesoft has tested their product extensively against evasion
techniques, which also explains the excellent results. They have released the evasion
test tool, which was utilized in this study, that supports the notion of comprehensive
testing.
Due to the nature of these findings, all the results of this study were disclosed
to Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority5. It included a detailed list of
successful evasion techniques and evasion combinations that were found against each
of the tested intrusion prevention systems.
5https://www.viestintavirasto.fi
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5.4 Reliability of the Results
The reliability of the results relies on the number of the attacks. A million attacks,
masqueraded by randomly selected evasions and evasion combinations, guarantee
that the test pool of evasion techniques is large. In previous studies [86] the mag-
nitude of the results has not been as large as it is in this study. Since the same
experiments, including the attacks with identical evasions and evasion combinations,
were run against each DUT, the results are comparable.
As previously discussed, the configurations of intrusion prevention systems play
an important role. The tested devices do not have the same capabilities, and they
also have their own unique functionalities. That is why the configurations were
standardized by following the guidelines that are presented in Section 4.2.2. The
configurations were verified multiple times during the experiments by checking, for
example, that the DUT was able to block an attack with and without obfuscation.
It was also made sure that the devices were not in any kind of an error state, which
could have an effect on the results.
The configurations of the tested IPS devices were usually hardened from the
default configurations making them better against attacks. By using standardized
configurations, the results of the experiments are comparable. The devices were
configured to perform like each other that makes comparison possible although the
possibility of a misconfiguration should not be overlooked. The used guidelines for
standardized configurations should significantly decrease the risk of an error. The
additional verifications of the proper behaviour of a DUT were also ways to ensure
the reliability of the results.
5.5 Summary
This chapter listed the results of the experiments and analysed the findings. The
results showed that almost all of the tested intrusion prevention systems were vul-
nerable to evasions and evasion combinations. It means that the threat that comes
from the evasions is real.
The results showed that even some relatively old evasion techniques from the
1990s were successful against the state of the art intrusion prevention systems. Even
though the techniques are old, they can be fine-tuned to fool most of the IPS de-
vices. It was also seen from the results that combining multiple evasion techniques
increased the possibility to find a way to evade detection. Additionally, the detec-
tion rates between the tested intrusion prevention systems varied significantly in
Experiment D.
The results also indicated that normalization and reassembly have not been
properly implemented in some of the tested intrusion prevention systems because the
number of successful attacks utilizing evasion techniques was so high. Reassembling
consumes resources significantly, and its significance may have been overlooked in
some of the implementations.
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6 Conclusions
Evasions are a real threat to the network security. The results from the experiments
show that almost all the tested intrusion prevention systems were vulnerable to
evasion techniques and evasion combinations.
The majority of the detection rates were over 95% in this study. When Windows
was targeted in the attacks that were masked with various evasion techniques, 9
out of 10 devices dropped over 95 percent of the attacks. Two of them dropped
over 99%. However, when targeting Ubuntu, only 4 out of 10 devices were able to
accomplish 95% detection rates.
The results indicate that intrusion prevention systems are vulnerable to evasion
techniques even though they were capable of detecting the majority of the attacks
that were masked with evasions. Unfortunately, it is not enough because it leaves
a possibility that some attacks go undetected when a suitable evasion technique
or evasion combinations are in use. Successful attacks leave no logs to intrusion
prevention systems. The fact also makes these attacks very serious.
Evasion techniques are not a new concept since the first academic papers about
evasions were published in the 1990s. These old atomic evasion techniques were
still effective against the state of the art intrusion prevention systems. Even though
the techniques are old, they can be fine-tuned to fool most of the IPS devices. In
certain cases, only one evasion technique was needed to utilize in an attack to avoid
detection. The majority of these tested atomic evasion techniques can be fine-tuned
to be effective against most of the tested intrusion prevention systems. Only one IPS
device was able to block all the attacks that were masked with carefully fine-tuned
atomic evasions.
There are millions of evasion combinations that can be utilized in attacks. By
using evasion combinations, almost all the tested intrusion prevention systems can be
tricked into passing malicious data. So, one evasion technique is not always enough
to avoid detection, but combining multiple techniques increases the possibility in
finding a way to evade detection.
The results indicate that normalization and reassembly have not been properly
implemented in some of the tested intrusion prevention systems because the number
of successful attacks utilizing evasion techniques was so high. Reassembling TCP/IP
traffic consumes resources significantly. The significance of reassembly may have
been overlooked in the implementations of various intrusion prevention systems to
ensure the highest performance.
Generally, the default configurations of intrusion prevention systems were not
strict enough to block the attacks that were masked with evasions. That is why
most of the configurations were hardened. It is also worth noticing that even though
a configuration process takes time, it is still beneficial to test configurations against
attacks that are masked with evasions. Thus, it can be maximised that an intrusion
prevention system can detect most attacks of this kind.
There are multiple ways to extend the work carried out in this thesis. This
thesis does not take into account the parameter values of evasion techniques. It
can be analysed if certain parameter values are more effective than the others when
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attacking various intrusion prevention systems. It is possible to study if the majority
of the tested intrusion prevention systems are vulnerable to attacks that are masked
with the same set of evasions and use the same parameter values.
The configurations of the tested intrusion prevention systems were hardened to
improve the results. However, it is possible that default configurations are used,
for example, in some corporations. That is why it can be tested how these devices
operate with default configurations. It is also possible to compare the detection
rates when using default configurations and hardened configurations to determine
the impact of configuration changes.
The throughput performance was not studied in the scope of this thesis. The
hardening of configurations improved the ability of intrusion prevention systems to
detect attacks that were masked with evasions, but implications for performance are
unknown.
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A Evasions
Table A1 lists all the evasion techniques that were used in this study. Column C
indicates the evasion techniques that were applicable when utilizing the Conficker
attack. In the same way, column H lists the evasion techniques that were available
and utilized with the HTTP phpBB Highlight attack.
The descriptions of the utilized evasion techniques were taken from Evader. The
description of an evasion technique can be fetched, for example, by using a com-
mand ./evader –attack=conficker –evasion=ipv4_frag where the attack and evasion
parameters are changed according to the evasion technique.
Table A1: All the evasions used in this study
Evasion Description C H
IPv4 fragmentation Fragment IPv4 packets to a given size. X X
IPv4 options Send duplicate IPv4 packets with a
changed payload and some IPv4 options.
X X
MSRPC big-endian Send MSRPC messages in the big-endian
byte order.
X -
MSRPC groupsends Group MSRPC fragments to a single
lower layer send.
X -
MSRPC NDR modifications Set NDR types, which are not related to
endianness.
X -
MSRPC request segmentation Set the maximum number of bytes writ-
ten in a single MSRPC fragment.
X -
NetBIOS chaff Send extra NetBIOS packets to break the
packet flow.
X -
NetBIOS initial chaff Send chaff NetBIOS packets when estab-
lishing the NetBIOS connection.
X -
SMB chaff Send SMB messages to baﬄe inspection. X -
SMB decoy trees Perform extra SMB writes before each
normal SMB write.
X -
SMB filename obfuscation Obfuscate the tree name, which is used
in the SMB NT Create AndX method.
X -
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Table A1 : (continued)
Evasion Description C H
SMB write segmentation Set the maximum number of bytes that
are written in a single SMB write.
X -
SMB WriteAndX padding Insert extra padding between the Write-
AndX header and payload.
X -
TCP chaff Send chaff TCP segments to baﬄe in-
spection.
X X
TCP initial sequence number Set the initial sequence number used by
a TCP socket to 0xffffffff - n.
X X
TCP timestamp option set-
tings
Set initial values to TCP timestamps. X X
TCP nocwnd Disable TCP congestion avoidance. X X
TCP no fast retrans Disable TCP fast retransmit. X X
TCP segment order Change the order of TCP segments. X X
TCP segment overlap Make segments that are sent in a single
send() to overlap.
X X
TCP PAWS elimination Send extra TCP segments that are elimi-
nated by PAWS in the destination stack.
X X
TCP receive window Set the receive window of a TCP socket.
This is used to force the other host to
send small TCP segments.
X X
TCP segmentation Set the MTU of a TCP socket. This
is used to create non-standard TCP seg-
mentation.
X X
TCP TIME-WAIT decoys Open decoy connections from the same
TCP source port before the actual at-
tack.
X X
TCP timestamp echo reply
modifications
Modify the echo reply field of a TCP
timestamp.
X X
TCP urgent data Set urgent data into TCP segments. X X
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Table A1 : (continued)
Evasion Description C H
HTTP header linear whites-
pace
Convert whitespaces in HTTP headers to
linear whitespaces (LWS) with a given
probability.
- X
HTTP known user agent Set the user agent to a widely known
value.
- X
HTTP request line separator Set the separator, which is used in the
request line.
- X
HTTP request method Set the request method. Possible val-
ues are, for example, GET, POST and
HELLO.
- X
HTTP request pipelined Send a valid request pipelined before the
exploit.
- X
HTTP URL absolute Change relative URIs into absolute
URLs.
- X
HTTP dummy paths Add dummy paths into an URL. - X
HTTP URL encoding Encode characters in URL. - X
HTTP request version Set the request version number. - X
